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Exiting Paris: What the Climate 
Accord Teaches About the 
Features of Treaties and 
Executive Agreements 
Eugene Kontorovich* 
In 2017, President Trump announced the United States’ 
intention to withdraw from the Paris Climate Accord. This 
article explores why the distinction between treaties and 
executive agreements cuts against treating the Accord as binding 
on the United States. The Accord’s unusual features—a 
protracted withdrawal period and broad multilateral structure—
preclude it having an effect as a sole executive agreement. These 
features should be regarded as signs that an international 
agreement is a treaty requiring Senate ratification. 
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Introduction 
President Barack Obama’s signing of the Paris Climate Accord1 
generated significant debate as to whether it should have been 
submitted to the Senate for ratification as a treaty.2  The debate has 
focused on numerous features of the agreement, such as its creation of 
 
* Professor, George Mason University Antonin Scalia Law School. 
1. “Paris Climate Accord,” “Paris Accord,” and “Paris Agreement” will be 
used interchangeably. 
2. Compare DANIEL BODANSKY, CTR. FOR CLIMATE AND ENERGY 
SOLUTIONS, LEGAL OPTIONS FOR U.S. ACCEPTANCE OF A NEW CLIMATE 
CHANGE AGREEMENT 2 (2015), with Steven Groves, The Paris 
Agreement Is a Treaty and Should Be Submitted to the Senate, THE 
HERITAGE FOUNDATION (Mar. 15, 2016), https://www.heritage.org 
/environment/report/the-paris-agreement-treaty-and-should-be-
submitted-the-senate [https://perma.cc/5NZZ-9HMD]. 
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domestic obligations,3 the treatment of prior climate agreements,4 and 
other factors.5 President Trump’s announcement of the U.S.’s 
intention to withdraw from the agreement has renewed focus on 
whether Obama’s entering into the agreement bound the U.S. in the 
first place.6 
This essay identifies several previously unexamined features of the 
Paris Climate Accord that cut heavily against it being treated as the 
kind of arrangement that can be entered into by a president on his 
own authority. First, it has a four-year waiting period for withdrawal, 
quite unlike traditional executive agreements.7 Second, it is a large 
multilateral deal,8 while the typical executive agreement is bilateral.9 
Moreover, the other parties to the Agreement have invariably 
regarded, for the purposes of their municipal systems, as a treaty that 
 
3. Compare David A. Wirth, Is the Paris Agreement on Climate Change a 
Legitimate Exercise of the Executive Agreement Power?, LAWFARE 
(Aug. 29, 2016), https://www.lawfareblog.com/paris-agreement-climate-
change-legitimate-exercise-executive-agreement-power 
[https://perma.cc/CCE4-TPUY], with Michael Ramsey, Declaring the 
Paris Climate Accord Unconstitutional, THE ORIGINALISM BLOG (June 1, 
2017), https://originalismblog.typepad.com/the-originalism-
blog/2017/06/declaring-the-paris-climate-accord-
unconstitutionalmichael-ramsey.html [https://perma.cc/4CET-XCVG]. 
4. Brad Plumer, Past Climate Treaties Failed. So the Paris Deal Will Try 
Something Radically Different, VOX (Dec. 14, 2015, 10:50 am EST), 
https://www.vox.com/2015/12/14/10105422/paris-climate-deal-history 
[https://perma.cc/FX82-7QAQ]. 
5. Dana Nuccitelli, Climate Scientists Debate a Flaw in the Paris Climate 
Agreement, THE GUARDIAN (Mar. 29, 2018, 6:00 EDT), 
https://www.theguardian.com/environment/ climate-consensus-97-per-
cent/2018/mar/28/climate-scientists-debate-a-flaw-in-the-paris-climate-
agreement [https://perma.cc/7APJ-L822]. 
6. Groves, supra note 2. 
7. Paris Agreement, art. 28, Apr. 22, 2016. 
8. Robert N. Stavins & Robert C. Stowe, The Paris Agreement and 
Beyond: International Climate Change Policy Post-2020, HARV. 
PROJECT ON CLIMATE AGREEMENTS, BELFER CTR. (Oct. 2016), 
https://www.belfercenter.org/publication/paris-agreement-and-beyond-
international-climate-change-policy-post-2020 [https://perma.cc/Q6UE-
3ZK6]. 
9. See U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, A LIST OF TREATISES AND OTHER 
INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS OF THE UNITED STATES IN FORCE ON 
JANUARY 1, 2018 (2018), available at https://www.state.gov 
/documents/organization/282222.pdf [https://perma.cc/JP86-D339] 
(cataloguing the numerous bilateral treaties that make up most 
executive agreements). 
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requires domestic ratification.10 Whatever that means for U.S. 
constitutional purposes, it does suggest other countries should hardly 
protest if President Trump merely follows their example and refuses 
to give it legal authority in the absence of ratification. These features 
– a protracted withdrawal period, and broad multilateral structure - 
are extremely unusual, or unprecedented, for sole executive 
agreements.11 This essay explains why they go to the heart of the 
treaty/executive agreement distinction.  
Because of these features, President Obama’s signing of the treaty 
without Senate ratification means that the Accord does not obligate 
the U.S. internationally or domestically.12 While this may seem a 
moot point given President Trump’s withdrawal, it is relevant for 
reasons particular to Paris, and more general ones. The announced 
U.S. withdrawal generated wide criticism domestically and 
internationally.13 President Trump’s announced exit will not take 
effect until a few months before the end of his term, and can be 
reversed at any point before then.14 Moreover, a future Democratic 
 
10. FAQs About How the Paris Agreement Enters into Force, WORLD 
RESOURCES INST’T, https://www.wri.org/faqs-about-how-paris-
agreement-enters-force [https://perma.cc/FU7J-7XQ2]. 
11. Eugene Kontorovich, The U.S. Can’t Quit the Paris Climate 
Agreement, Because it Never Actually Joined, WASH. POST: VOLOKH 
CONSPIRACY (June 1, 2017), https://www. 
washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2017/06/01/the-u-s-
cant-quit-the-paris-climate-agreement-because-it-never-actually-
joined/?utm_term=.294de1620eac [https://perma.cc/6YK3-WXQ6]. 
12. President Trump’s announcement of the U.S. intent to withdraw from 
the Agreement did not make clear whether he regarded it as binding ab 
initio. However, subsequent statements by the State Department make 
it clear that the U.S. is exiting the agreement pursuant to the 
agreement’s own terms. This may suggest that the Trump 
Administration views the deal as binding in some sense; it may also 
suggest a belt-and-suspenders approach, where the Administration does 
not wish to resolve the constitutional issues involved and exits in 
conformity with the accord’s provisions to cover all possible legal bases. 
See Communication Regarding Intent To Withdraw From Paris 
Agreement, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE (Aug. 4, 2017), 
https://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2017/08/273050.htm 
[https://perma.cc/EF2Q-YM6M]. 
13. Philip Rucker & Jenna Johnson, Trump Announces U.S. Will Exit Paris 
Climate Deal, Sparking Criticism at Home and Abroad, WASH. POST 
(June 1, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/trump-to-
announce-us-will-exit-paris-climate-deal/2017/06/01/fbcb0196-46da-
11e7-bcde-624ad94170ab_story.html?utm_term=.010d29fb4dd5 
[https://perma.cc/7WJ4-5QW6]. 
14. Chelsea Harvey, Withdrawing from the Paris Deal Takes Four Years. 
Our Next President Could Join Again in 30 days., WASH. POST (June 5, 
2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com /news/energy-
environment/wp/2017/06/05/withdrawing-from-the-paris-deal-takes-
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president is likely to promptly “rejoin” the Accord, but again without 
the Senate’s advice and consent. None of these actions would, this 
essay argues, make the Accord binding on the U.S. Moreover, 
ambitious multilateral agreements will likely become more common 
for environmental and other matters in the foreseeable future. The 
Senate will likely remain reluctant to ratify them, and thus presidents 
will more frequently seek to enter into such agreements through their 
authority to make executive agreements.  In short, the Paris Accord is 
the first but not last of such attempts. This essay identifies several 
features that such executive agreements cannot have; that is, features 
that would require an agreement to be submitted to the Senate before 
it could have legal effect. 
Part I of this essay briefly sketches the constitutional distinction 
between treaties, congressional-executive agreements, and sole 
executive agreements. Part II examines the Paris Accord’s uniquely 
onerous withdrawal provisions and shows why they preclude treating 
it as a SEA. Part III examines the Paris Agreement’s multilateral 
nature and shows how it does not accord with the past practice for 
SEAs. 
I. The Role of Executive Agreements 
The Constitution allows the president to “make Treaties,” subject 
to the consent of two-thirds of the Senate.15 Such treaties fully bind 
the U.S. and have a domestic status equivalent to statutes.16 At the 
same time, it is well accepted that there is a class of international 
agreements that the president can commit the U.S. to without 
invoking the treaty process.17 Indeed, the vast majority of America’s 
international agreements are not made through the constitutional 
treaty process.18 Such agreements are of two kinds. “Congressional-
 
four-years-our-next-president-could-join-again-in-30-
days/?utm_term=.9b4548a4f240 [https://perma.cc/BK8P-3WTA]. 
15. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. 
16. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. 
17. STEPHEN P. MULLIGAN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL32528, 
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND AGREEMENTS: THEIR EFFECT UPON U.S. LAW 
6–8 (2018). In international law, the term “treaty” is one of the many 
terms for a binding international agreement, none of which are legally 
significant. In international law, an agreement, however denominated, is 
binding. Not all agreements that are “treaties” in the international law 
sense – i.e., that create a binding international obligation – are 
“Treaties” in the constitutional sense. See Vienna Convention on the 
Law of Treaties, art. 1, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 (applying to 
treaties).  
18. Curtis Bradley, Exiting Congressional-Executive Agreements, 67 DUKE 
L. J. 1615, 1626 (2018). 
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executive agreements” are entered into by the president pursuant to 
legislative authorization.19 While they are not ratified by two-thirds of 
the Senate, they have a different kind of supermajority support—
majorities in both houses of Congress.20 Given the broad authorities of 
the president and Congress in matters of foreign trade and policy, 
such agreements are not controversial.21  
Finally, presidents have entered into many agreements without 
invoking the treaty process or congressional authorization.22 However, 
the constitutionally permissible scope of the “sole executive 
agreement” (“SEA”) category is a matter of great dispute.23 Such 
agreements are typically justified by the president’s invocation of his 
inherent constitutional powers, such as recognition and foreign 
relations, or as commander-in-chief.24 They typically deal with low-
level bilateral issues of cooperation and take the form of exchanges of 
letters, memoranda of understanding, and the like.25 While the use of 
SEAs is both venerable and vast, the precise line between what 
international agreements can be entered into by the president on his 
own authority and those that require congressional action remains 
vague.  
For most purposes, SEAs are not controversial. Yet important 
agreements raise the issue of the constitutionally permissible scope 
and effect of SEAs. Scholars have suggested that the distinction 
 
19. Id. at 1625. 
20. John C. Yoo, Laws as Treaties: The Constitutionality of Congressional-
Executive Agreements, 99 MICH. L. REV. 757, 758 (2000). 
21. See Congressional-Executive Agreement, ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRITANNICA 
(June 5, 2016), https://www.britannica.com/topic/congressional-
executive-agreement [https://perma.cc/GU86-JFW9] (defining 
congressional-executive agreements). As a textual matter, the 
Constitution recognizes the existence of agreements other than Art. III 
“Treaties” – in particular, the “compacts” and “agreements” that states 
can enter into with congressional consent. See U.S. Const. art. 1, § 10. 
cl. 3. 
22. See Daniel Bodansky & Peter J. Spiro, Executive Agreements+, 49 
VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 885, 887 (2016) (defining a new type of 
agreement known as executive-agreements+, distinct from other types of 
international agreements). Some scholars have gone so far as to argue 
that the Paris Agreement represents an exotic and previously 
unidentified species of international deals that fall between 
congressional-executive agreements and SEAs. Id. 
23. See MULLIGAN, supra note 17, at 7–9 (demonstrating the Supreme 
Court’s determination on whether the President has authority to enter 
agreements in certain contexts). 
24. See Id. at 7–8 (delineating where the President has exclusive 
constitutional authority). 
25. See Id. at 8 (discussing two prior agreements handling assets assignment 
and ending US involvement in Vietnam). 
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between treaties and SEAs lies in the “length and importance of the 
agreement.”26 As this essay shows, the Paris Climate Accord differs in 
kind and degree from prior SEAs on both these criteria, and instead 
looks more like a treaty. 
While there are no clear rules about the treaty/executive 
agreement, the Paris Accord has some features, not yet analyzed in 
this context, that do not follow the pattern of past SEAs. Simply 
pointing out that there are such things as SEAs does not mean the 
Paris Accord is one of them, given that it departs from the SEA 
model in significant ways. 
II. Delayed Withdrawal provisions in Executive 
Agreements 
One formal feature of the Paris Climate Accord distinguishes it 
from the extensive past use of SEAs—the withdrawal provision. This 
Part shows that distinction has constitutional significance and places 
the Paris Accord outside the accepted constitutional scope of SEAs.  
The Paris Accord has a four-year delayed exit period: at the time 
the agreement comes into force, a state party to the deal can only 
withdraw after four years.27 There is no constitutional limit on 
delayed withdrawal periods in treaties28—ten years is the standard 
waiting period under U.S. bilateral investment treaties.29 However, 
typical withdrawal periods are much shorter.30 Most treaties do not 
provide for any waiting period for withdrawal.31 However, the Vienna 
 
26. Michael D. Ramsey, Executive Agreements and the (Non)treaty power, 
77 N.C. L. Rᴇᴠ. 133, 184 (1998). 
27. CONG. RESEARCH SERV., PRESIDENT TRUMP’S WITHDRAWAL FROM THE PARIS 
AGREEMENT RAISES LEGAL QUESTIONS: PART 1 (2017). The actual 
withdrawal period requires one-year notice; but no withdrawal is 
permitted at all for the first three years after the agreement comes into 
force. In practice, the earliest permitted withdrawal for the U.S. under 
the terms of the Agreement is Nov. 4, 2016, the day after the next U.S. 
presidential election. Id. 
28. See CONG. RESEARCH SERV.., R44761, WITHDRAWAL FROM 
INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS: LEGAL FRAMEWORK, THE PARIS 
AGREEMENT, AND THE IRAN NUCLEAR AGREEMENT 1 (2018) (“Although 
the Constitution sets forth a definite procedure whereby the Executive 
has the power to make treaties with the advice and consent of the 
Senate, it is silent as to how treaties may be terminated.”). 
29. Kathryn Gordon & Joachim Pohl, Investment Treaties over Time - 
Treaty Practice and Interpretation in a Changing World 19 (Org. for 
Econ. Co-operation and Dev., Working Paper No. 02, 2015). Indeed, 
almost all BITs have an initial 10-year limitation on withdraw, followed 
by waiting periods that are 12.5 years on average. Id. 
30. Kontorovich, supra note 11. 
31. Id. 
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Convention on the Law of Treaties provides one year as a default 
withdrawal period for treaties containing no explicit withdrawal 
provisions.32 But many treaties do have such terms—almost 
invariably shorter than four years.33 Indeed, six months or a year are 
the most common waiting periods.34  
However, withdrawal provisions for SEAs look quite different. In 
that context, the Paris Accord restrictions are truly remarkable, and 
go far beyond the kind of “thin” agreement allowed under sole 
executive authority. The justification of SEAs is that they are an 
inherent part of a president’s foreign affairs powers because the 
conduct of foreign affairs requires the frequent formal arrangements 
between countries.35 But he can also unmake them as needed.36  
Indeed, the “temporary” nature of executive agreements has long 
been seen as one of their defining and self-limiting features.37 
President Theodore Roosevelt took the view that an SEA does not 
even bind the signing president’s successors unless explicitly 
renewed.38 While extensive usage appears to reject that strong 
position, there is also no support for its converse—that an SEA can 
bind or restrict the ability of a successor to exit it.39 
A protracted withdrawal period in an SEA would allow one 
president to unilaterally pre-commit his successor and limit the 
latter’s powers. Such action could be deliberate. Numerous news 
accounts suggest that the Paris Agreement’s four-year period was not 
accidental.40 Rather, it was specifically designed to block U.S. exit in 
 
32. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 56, May 23, 1969, 1155 
U.N.T.S. 331. 
33. Kontorovich, supra note 11. 
34. Id. 
35. MULLIGAN, supra note 17, at 7–8. 
36. Bradley, supra note 18, at 1626. 
37. See Edwin Borchard, Treaties and Executive Agreements-a Reply, 54 
YALE L. REV. 616, 640-41 (1945) (demonstrating the over 70 years of 
acceptance that Presidents can unilaterally withdraw from SEAs). 
38. F.M. Brewer, Executive Agreements, EDITORIAL RESEARCH REPORTS 
(1943), http://library.cqpress.com/cqresearcher/cqresrre1943070100 
[https://perma.cc/4XQY-VVRD].  
39. Borchard, supra note 37 (“The successor cannot be bound by the 
executive agreements of his predecessor”). 
40. Tim McDonnell, Have We Solved Climate Change Yet?, SLATE (Apr. 22, 
2016), https://slate.com/technology/2016/04/signing-the-paris-
agreement-is-one-small-step-forward-for-fighting-climate-change.html 
[https://perma.cc/WW5D-5X2J]; see also Brian Palmer, Is America 
Actually Out of the Paris Agreement?, NRDC (Aug. 30, 2017), 
https://www.nrdc.org/stories/america-actually-out-paris-agreement 
[https://perma.cc/DT32-XX2R]. 
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the event of a possible Republican presidential victory in 2016.41 
Indeed, the narrow window for the U.S. exit President Trump seeks 
to employ (from Nov. 4, 2020 until the inauguration of the next 
president) may largely have been an unintended consequence of the 
Agreement receiving the necessary number of ratifications to enter 
into effect faster than had been expected.42  
This is not to say the motives of an agreement’s drafters in 
crafting the withdrawal provision should determine whether it can be 
entered into by the U.S. as an SEA. Rather, it demonstrates the 
sound policy reasons for restricting the scope of SEAs—whose 
constitutional basis is already less than pellucid—to agreements that 
can be conveniently exited by a successor administration. To be sure, 
this leaves open the question of how long an acceptable withdrawal 
period can be. Even a year-long waiting period can limit the 
discretion of a successor if entered into in the last days of the prior 
administration. As with many constitutional questions of time limits, 
the question does not admit of a bright-line answer.43 In practice, the 
vast precedent of past SEAs should serve as useful guides, and as will 
be seen, the four-year period is far outside accepted norms.44 
An examination of many executive agreements from various 
decades shows that withdrawal periods longer than a year are quite 
extraordinary. From 1928 to 1945, the State Department published 
executive agreements in a separate collection, the Executive 
Agreements Series.45 While obviously containing older agreements, 
this collection does not require winnowing agreements from treaties. A 
search of the entire collection found no agreement with a withdrawal 
 
41. McDonnell, supra note 40; see also Palmer, supra note 40. 
42. See Palmer, supra note 40 (explaining how the Paris Agreement seemed 
designed to prevent right-leaning, leaders from exiting the agreement 
during their tenure).  
43. See Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 451–53 (1939) (holding that the 
time period a constitutional amendment remains open for ratification is 
non-justiciable, because there is no judicial method of determining what 
is too short or too long a time period). For this reason, the Court has 
treated analogous time-limit questions as non-justiciable political 
questions. Id. 
44. See generally Oona A. Hathaway, Presidential Power over International 
Law: Restoring the Balance, 119 YALE L. J. 140, 258-59 (2009) (arguing 
that agreements that do not allow withdraw for a period of more than 
one year should not be entered into as SEAs, but rather as some kind of 
congressional-executive agreement). 
45. Finding Agreements, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, 
https://www.state.gov/s/l/treaty/text/ [https://perma.cc/5FQH-
9WS5]. 
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period longer than six months, with thirty days being perhaps the 
most common time period.46  
To examine whether more recent agreements have lengthier 
withdrawal provisions, I compiled a list of all SEAs in 2008, 2009, 
2016, and 2017— the two most recent years at the time the research 
was conducted, and two prior years picked for convenience.47 The 
agreements made in these years had a variety of withdrawal 
provisions ranging from one month to a year, but none longer than 
one year.48 Based on my findings, the average for 87 agreements in 
2008 was 137 days; 165 days in 2008, and 226 days in 2016.49 Thus, it 
seems the most common withdrawal notice requirement in SEAs is 
half a year; durations longer than one year may be unprecedented.  
One might argue that entering into a SEA with a protracted 
withdraw period does not limit subsequent presidents, because as a 
matter of domestic authority, they can always quit a SEA, even in 
violation of the agreement’s provisions. But this would breach 
international commitments, making it harder in practice for the 
subsequent president to use his undisputed executive authority. 
Indeed, this is precisely the argument many made against Trump’s 
exit of the Paris Accords – that it breaches U.S. obligations. His 
adherence to the withdrawal provision period underscores how 
significant a constraint such agreements are, and the need for 
congressional authorization in such cases. 
Such deep commitment cannot be made without the involvement 
of the Senate. This quite unusual feature of President Obama’s 
agreement strongly suggests it cannot be treated as an SEA, and thus 
it has no force until the Senate ratifies it.  
 
II. Multilateral Nature and Other Parties’ Practice 
This Part deals with several aspects of the multilateral structure 
of the Paris Accord. Firstly, the multilateral nature of the agreement 
 
46. Eugene Kontorovich, Collection of SEAs from 2008-09 and 2016-17, 
available at https://perma.cc/JTQ3-KLS9 [hereinafter SEA 
Spreadsheet]. 
47. See id. The State Department publishes all U.S. international 
agreements, in a collection known as Texts of International Agreements 
to Which the United States is a Party. This collection makes no 
distinction between treaties, SEAs, and congressional-executive 
agreements. That distinction is only sometimes clear from the titles, and 
even the text of the agreements, and thus examining SEAs particularly 
requires individually identifying them by determining whether they were 
submitted to the Senate. Finding Agreements, supra note 45. 
48. See SEA Spreadsheet, supra note 46. 
49. Id. 
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is itself exceptional for SEAs. Moreover, the Paris Accord is a 
particular type of multilateral agreement—one held open for 
membership to all states of the world, and contemplating universal 
participation.50 To facilitate this, the U.N. Secretary General serves as 
the depositary for the agreement.51 All these features correlate 
strongly with the importance and breadth of the agreement, and thus 
point towards constitutional treaty status. Moreover, these factors are 
fairly formal, and thus well-suited to a legal test that must make a 
binary distinction between SEAs and other agreements. Finally, the 
other Paris Accord signatories have overwhelmingly approached it as 
an agreement requiring domestic ratification processes.52 While not 
strictly relevant to its U.S. constitutional status, the fact that 
apparently only the U.S. entered into it as an executive agreement is 
certainly noteworthy, and at least is relevant to whether an American 
exit can legitimately be seen by other nations as a breach of 
international commitments. 
A.   Formal Structure of the Agreement 
The difference between broad multilateral treaties and bilateral 
agreements is recognized in international law,53 as well as U.S. foreign 
relations practice.54 Multilateral obligation also correlates strongly 
with the scope, duration, and importance of the obligation being 
undertaken.55 One indication that multilateral treaties are “bigger 
deals” is the far lower ratification rates they enjoy in the Senate.56  
 
50. What is the Paris Agreement?, UNFCCC, https://unfccc.int/process-
and-meetings/the-paris-agreement/what-is-the-paris-agreement 
[https://perma.cc/S5DT-D3ZC] (last visited Nov. 11, 2018). 
51. FAQs, supra note 10. 
52. Id. 
53. See Vienna Convention on the Laws of Treaties art. 60, Jan. 27, 1980, 
1155 U.N.T.S. 331 (distinguishing the difference between breach of a 
bilateral treaty versus a multilateral treaty). 
54. See Brett Schaefer, The Role and Relevance of Multilateral Diplomacy 
in U.S. Foreign Policy, THE HERITAGE FOUNDATION (Feb. 14, 2011), 
https://www.heritage.org/global-politics/report/the-role-and-relevance-
multilateral-diplomacy-us-foreign-policy [https://perma.cc/9NQG-H4JN] 
(discussing the importance of difference diplomatic approaches to 
multilateral versus bilateral treaties). 
55. Jeffery S. Peake & Glen S. Krutz, President Barack Obama, 
Partisanship, and the Politics of International Agreement, 1 SSRN J. 16 
(Aug. 1, 2014), available at 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2587806 
[https://perma.cc/T8ZG-5DNE] (“Multilateral treaties, by their nature, 
typically involve more significant and controversial issues, including 
human rights, arms control, and the environment.”). 
56. See Johannes Thimm, The United States and Multilateral Treaties, in 
THE UNITED STATES AND MULTILATERAL TREATIES: A POLICY PUZZLE 1 
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Most, if not all the past practice supporting executive agreements 
consists of exchanges of notes and settlement agreements – all of 
which are bilateral.57 Certainly such agreements were almost entirely 
bilateral until the 20th century, as multilateral agreements of any kind 
were quite rare until then.58  
Multilateral executive agreements remain exceedingly rare, and 
perhaps unprecedented, according to several studies.59 Moreover, these 
studies do not distinguish between SEAs and congressional-executive 
agreements, making it unclear if there is any precedent for broad 
multilateral SEAs.60 To be sure, some important multilateral 
treaties—for example, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
(GATT) and  the World Trade Organization (WTO) Agreement—
have not been submitted to the Senate, but were done pursuant to 
explicit congressional grants of authority and not as SEAs.61  
 
(2016) (“More often than not, America remains outside of multilateral 
treaties, including some that enjoy almost universal membership 
otherwise.”). 
57. MULLIGAN, supra note 17 at 7–9 
58. BILATERAL AND REGIONAL TRADE AGREEMENTS: COMMENTARY AND 
ANALYSIS VOL. 1, 3 (Simon Lester et al. eds., 2016). 
59. See JEFFREY S. PEAKE & GLEN S. KURTZ, TREATY POLITICS AND THE 
RISE OF EXECUTIVE AGREEMENTS: INTERNATIONAL COMMITMENTS IN A 
SYSTEM OF SHARED POWERS 90 (University of Michigan Press eds., 
2009) (finding that the “baseline probability of a . . . multilateral 
agreement being a treaty is .63” and that multilateral nature is by far 
the biggest predictor of an agreement being a treaty rather than an 
executive agreement); see also S. Rep. No. 106-71, at 42 (reporting that 
multilateral treaties represent a much smaller share of executive 
agreements (4.6%) than of Senate-submitted treaties). 
60. See Mark Bond, The Minamata Convention and the Paris Climate 
Agreement: Insights Into Senate-less Adoption, CLIMATE L. BLOG (Feb. 
16, 2015), 
http://blogs.law.columbia.edu/climatechange/2015/02/16/the-
minamata-convention-and-the-paris-climate-agreement-insights-into-
senate-less-adoption/ [https://perma.cc/M4GB-FLHX] (discussing how 
the Minamata Convention is somewhere between a sole-executive and 
congressional-executive agreements). But see Bodansky, supra note 22, 
at 910-11 (noting that the Minamata Convention may properly be 
understood as a congressional-executive agreement). 
61. See JANE M. SMITH ET AL. CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 7-5700, WHY 
CERTAIN TRADE AGREEMENTS ARE APPROVED AS CONGRESSIONAL-
EXECUTIVE AGREEMENTS RATHER THAN TREATIES 1 (2013) (discussing 
how the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988 (OTCA) and 
the Trade Act of 1974 granted the President authority to enter tariff 
and nontariff trade barrier agreements.). Status of forces agreements 
provide a telling example. These are among the most well accepted 
contexts for sole executive agreements, relying in part on the 
Commander-in-Chief authority. The NATO SOFA is the only 
multilateral one to which the U.S. is a party, and it is also the only such 
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Multilateralism is of course a matter of degree.62 As a matter of 
principle, it would be hard to justify a constitutional distinction 
between bilateral, and say, trilateral executive SEAs. After that of 
course, everything is a matter of degree.  But the Paris Accord is a 
particular kind of ultra-multilateral agreement. It is a “universal” 
agreement - which international law recognizes is qualitatively, not 
just quantitively,  different from agreements that happen to have 
multiple parties.63 A “plurilateral treaty” is one that is open to 
numerous members, but from a limited set of countries with a 
particular interest in a certain matter, for example, sharing of natural 
resources in a lake or a mutual defense agreement.64 On the other 
hand, the Paris Agreement and other major modern multilateral 
agreements seek “universal participation.”65 When an agreement aims 
at full participation, this is seen as an essential part of its character.66 
Such treaties are, because of their subject matter and broad 
regulatory aims, more ambitious than other agreements.67  
It is important to note another related formal trapping of the 
Paris Agreement—the role of the U.N. Secretary General as 
depositary.68  The Secretary General only accepts this role for 
“multilateral treaties of worldwide interest” and treaties open 
 
agreement to have submitted to the Senate as a treaty. See R. CHUCK 
MASON, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 34531, STATUS OF FORCES 
AGREEMENT (SODA): WHAT IS IT AND HOW HAS IT BEEN UTILIZED? 1-2 
(2009). 
62. Joseph S. Nye, America Can’t Go It Alone: Unilateralism vs. 
Multilateralism, N.Y. TIMES (June 13, 2002), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2002/06/13/opinion/IHT-america-cant-go-it-
alone-unilateralism-vs-multilateralism.html [https://perma.cc/F74R-
J4XQ]. 
63. See Naghmeh Nasirtousi & Karin Bäckstrand, International Climate 
Politics in the post-Paris era, NORDIC ECON. POLICY R. (forthcoming 
April 2019) (describing the Paris Agreement as “a new model of ‘hybrid 
multilateralism’…”).   
64. PROF. DR. RAYMOND SANER, PLURILATERAL AGREEMENTS: KEY TO 
SOLVING IMPASSE OF WTO/DOHA ROUND AND BASIS FOR FUTURE TRADE 
AGREEMENTS WITHIN THE WTO CONTEXT 3-5 (2012). 
65. EMILY O’BRIAN & RICHARD GOWEN, WHAT MAKES INTERNATIONAL 
AGREEMENTS WORK: DEFINING FACTORS FOR SUCCESS 4 (2012).  
66. See Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment 
of the Crime of Genocide, Advisory Opinion, 1951 I.C.J. Rep. 51, at 10 
(May 28,) (noting as relevant to the treaty’s interpretation “the clearly 
universal character of the United Nations under whose auspices the 
Convention was concluded, and the very wide degree of participation 
envisaged by Article XI of the Convention.”). 
67. O’BRIAN & GOWAN, supra note 65, at 31. 
68. Paris Agreement, art. 26, Dec 12, 2015, U.N.T.C. No. 54113. 
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generally to membership, such as those negotiated at U.N. 
conferences.69 Thus, the Paris Agreement is among the “most” 
multilateral kinds of treaties.70 It is not clear if the U.S. has even used 
an executive agreement to join any multilateral treaty of which the 
Secretary General serves as the depositary.71 Current State 
Department guidelines about what constitutes a treaty and what an 
SEA (known as Circular 175) list numerous criteria for determining 
which agreements should be treated as treaties, such as past U.S. 
practice with similar agreements, the general international practice 
with similar agreements, the degree of formality, and so forth.72 All of 
these factors, as applied to universal multilateral treaties, point 
towards treating the Paris Accords as a treaty. That is, other 
universal agreements have always been regarded by the U.S. as 
treaties for constitutional purposes. 
One of the fundamental difficulties in policing the treaty/SEA 
line is that while there is broad agreement on numerous relevant 
factors, there is no test for how many of them are needed and how 
they are balanced.73 Moreover, many of the Circular 175 factors 
themselves are qualitative in nature.74 It may be that the universal 
multilateral nature of an agreement would serve as a good, formal 
test—a rule of inclusion, not exclusion—for which agreements should 
be regarded as treaties.  
B.   Other Parties Treat it as a Treaty 
The fundamental American exceptionalism with regards to the 
Paris Accord  lies not in President Trump’s decision to exit, but in 
President Obama’s decision to not seek ratification. The U.S. appears 
to be alone in its “non-treaty” interpretation.75 The signatory states  
69. Off. of Legal Aff., Summary of Practice of the Secretary-General as 
Depositary of Multilateral Treaties, U.N. Doc. ST/LEG/7/Rev.1 at 7. 
(1999). 
70. See JOSEPH ALDY ET AL., THE PARIS AGREEMENT AND BEYOND: 
INTERNATIONAL CLIMATE CHANGE POLICY POST-2020 1 (2016) (noting 
that the Paris Agreement is “a breakthrough in multilateral efforts…”). 
71. See Multilateral Treaties Deposited with the Secretary-General, UNITED 
NATIONS TREATY COLLECTION (Participant Search: United States of 
America). 
72. See DEP’T OF STATE, Memorandum on Power to Enter into 
International Arms Control Agreements (Feb. 27, 2002), 
https://www.state.gov/s/l/38636.htm [https://perma.cc /U59Z-V427] 
(discussing the factors to consider when entering treaties). 
73. Groves, supra note 2. 
74. DEP’T OF STATE, Circular 175 Procedure, 
https://www.state.gov/s/l/treaty/c175/ [https://perma.cc/Q4J6-
QQ9Q]. 
75. Groves, supra note 2. 
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seem invariably to have accepted the Paris Agreement as a treaty 
that requires going through their internal treaty-ratification processes, 
typically made by submission to the legislature.76 The United 
Kingdom, China, and Jamaica have ratified it through their 
legislatures, and so has Brazil, Japan,  the Philippines, and 
Australia.77 In the latter, the question of whether it was a binding 
international accord requiring submission to Parliament received some 
discussion, and a parliamentary analysis concluded it was a “major 
treaty” that needed to be submitted.78 While this essay does not 
examine all 180 current ratifications of the Agreement, it seems to 
have overwhelmingly gone through domestic processes for treaties 
rather than processes for agreements.  
The universal interpretation of the Agreement as a treaty cuts 
against President Obama’s insistence that it is not one. A treaty is an 
international agreement, and in a multilateral treaty, the views of 
other signatories are at least probative of the question of whether it 
creates binding obligations upon ratification. Indeed, the State 
Department practice treats “general international practice as to 
similar agreements” —whether they are regarded as treaties or not—
as a relevant factor in the domestic determination.79 This certainly 
implies that “international practice” as to the specific agreement in 
question would be highly relevant.  
To be sure, the question of what kind of agreements must be 
submitted to the Senate is not governed by a foreign country’s rules 
about treaty ratification—the meaning of the U.S. Constitution is 
determined endogenously, not by reference to other countries’ 
constitutional practices.80 In particular the U.S. definition of “treaty” 
for constitutional purposes is considerably narrower than the 
 
76. FAQs, supra note 10. 
77. See Paris Agreement Ratification Tracker, CLIMATE ANALYTICS (2017), 
https://climateanalytics.org/briefings/ratification-tracker/ 
[https://perma.cc/QM3F-4JTP] (listing all countries who have ratified 
the Paris Agreement).  
78. See generally Joint Standing Committee on Treaties, Parliament of the 
Commonwealth of Australia, Report 163, Paris Agreement, Kyoto 
Protocol - Doha Amendment (Nov. 2016) (outlining the discussion 
about the ratification of the Paris Agreement through the Australian 
Parliament).  
79. DEP’T OF STATE, 11 FAM 723.3 CONSIDERATIONS FOR SELECTING AMONG 
CONSTITUTIONALLY AUTHORIZED PROCEDURES (2006). 
80. For a discussion on Constitutional interpretation and its relationship to 
international law, see Eugene Kontorovich, Disrespecting the “Opinions 
of Mankind”: International Law in Constitutional Interpretation, 8 
GREEN BAG 2D 261 (2005). 
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definition of “treaty” in international law.81 The definition in various 
other countries’ constitutions may also be broader or narrower. So it 
is not the other country’s decision to seek legislative ratification that 
is relevant, but rather the view that it creates binding international 
commitments. 
However, when the Constitution incorporates international legal 
terms of art—such as in the “Treaty” Clause82—it may incorporate 
international law by reference, with respect to those specific 
provisions.83 Thus from the earliest cases, courts have looked to 
international law for the purpose of distinguishing treaties from other 
agreements.84 The writings of Emmerich de Vattel, the international 
law author most familiar to the Framers,85 have played a large role in 
these discussions.86 Indeed, the Supreme Court has suggested that the 
international legal trappings of an agreement are relevant to the 
constitutional treaty-sole executive agreement distinction.87 Yet this 
essay does not intend to argue that international law conclusively 
determines what constitutes a constitutional “treaty,” because 
overwhelming precedent establishes that constitutional category to be 
far narrower than the international legal one.88 
Thus while the treatment by  other signatories of the Paris 
Agreement as may not be strictly relevant for constitutional purposes, 
it is nonetheless useful for understanding the nature of the U.S.’s 
international obligations under the Agreement. Some have argued 
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between nations. In the United States, the word treaty is reserved for an 
agreement that is made ‘by and with the Advice and Consent of the 
Senate…’”). 
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(2009) (discussing whether the incorporation of international law by 
specific constitutional provisions which use international law terms of 
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changes in international law). 
84. See Holmes v. Jennison, 39 U.S. 540, 571 (1840) (“For when we speak of 
‘a treaty,’ we mean an instrument written and executed with the 
formalities customary among nations . . . .”). 
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that even if President Trump’s non-acceptance of obligations under 
the Agreement would be consistent with the Constitution, it would be 
a breach of an international obligation and weaken foreign trust in 
U.S. commitments.89 Yet foreign countries are in no place to complain 
if the U.S. insists on treating the Agreement as a treaty requiring 
submission to the legislature because that is exactly how they have 
treated it themselves.90 Knowing that the Agreement was not ratified 
by the U.S. Senate , they should not expect the U.S. to be bound, as 
they would not regard themselves bound under similar circumstances. 
Conclusion 
President Trump did not quit the Paris Accord because the U.S. 
was never in it in the first place. Several features of the Agreement, 
such as its extensive withdrawal delay time and its strong multilateral 
structure, distinguish it functionally and formally from past SEAs. A 
future president who rejoins Paris will be in the same position 
President Obama was in: at least as a matter of domestic 
constitutional law, he will not have committed the U.S. 
Looking forward, the difficulty of the U.S. constitutional treaty 
process makes it quite likely that future presidents will be tempted to 
enter into broad, long-lasting multilateral commitments in areas such 
as environmental regulation through SEAs.91 This is particularly 
tempting because the constitutional limits on SEAs are fuzzy. But the 
Paris Agreement’s extremely long withdrawal period, along with its 
structure as broad multilateral U.N. treaty, clearly distinguish it from 
past executive agreements, and require it to be treated as a treaty to 
have domestic effect.  
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